2005.01.05
Open Source Voting Machines
Now that the controversy and hoopla from the 2004 elections has simmered down (a little at least), I think it’s time I addressed something I thought was interesting regarding electronic voting. Nothing in the next two paragraphs will be new information; just a summation. The rest of the article I hope will be of more interest.
In America our electronic voting machines are primarily designed and built by three private, for-profit companies: Election Systems & Software (ES&S), Sequoia, and Diebold. A lot of controversy surround their systems. For example, their systems were and are not open to public scrutiny. This means that you have to take their word that their systems were safe, secure, and that votes were guaranteed and verifiable.
Further issues about, however, regarding the ties these companies have with political figures and groups. For example Diebold’s CEO, Walden O’Dell, is a well known Republican fund-raiser. A memo he sent out promised Ohio’s votes to Bush. Other companies are funded by very large government and defense contractors. There are known and exploitable flaws in some of the software packages. Verifiability is questionable at best. (For a scathing criticism along these lines see this article which outlines many of the publicly known aspects of corruption, criminality and incriminating links.)
Voting is a fundamental right in America and is everyone’s concern. The systems these private, for-profit companies have turned out have serious flaws.. It is clear to me, at least, and hopefully others that electronic voting in America needs a few improvements.
Trust. We have to be able to trust that their vote counts. Voting is a fundamental right in America and our democratic method of governing depends on the voting process functioning in a way that everyone believes trustworthy. Without this trust relationship with the voting process you will have more citizen complaints about unfair elections and fraud, more court decisions that make no one happy except the winner, and a deterioration of the American democratic method.
Simplicity. The machines and their interface have to be simple to use, in multiple languages, and handicap accessible (braille and audio interfaces of some sort). Anyone who is a citizen should be able to vote in a manner that is comfortable and uncomplicated.
Accountability. The system has to maintain a system of verifiable checks and balances. Not only will this aid in trust and confidence, but will allow election results to be certifiable by any legitimate source. Multiple counting methods should be integrated, from digital tallying (at multiple locations) to a paper trail (both for the election committees and a receipt for each voter). The strongest form of encryption should be used. A closed network inaccessible from the internet, telephone lines, radio, WiFi, or other communications should be used.
Open Source. The software and hardware schematics used in the voting process should be open source. This will allow any citizen with the knowledge and/or inclination to look at and confirm the wares involved. In case you’ve missed the past several years of technological innovation and think a closed source system would be better (keep those hackers/terrorists/hippies from ruining the election!), please read this article for general information or this one for how it has been applied to the biotech industry.
Keeping our voting systems open source using an open method allows vulnerabilities to be spotted and fixed, allows each of us to participate (if we so choose) in the process, and helps maintain trust in the voting process. I believe that until such a system is created that I will not be using electronic voting. If anyone doesn’t believe it can be done, Australia has already done it (and be sure to visit some of the links in that article; they are all relevant).
Categorized: political rights technology
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